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‘Glocal’	Disorder:	
Causes,	Conduct	and	Consequences		
of	the	2008	Greek	Unrest	
	
	
Criminological	 analysis	 of	 riots	 and	 social	 unrest	 has	 long	 been	 dominated	 by	
single‐case	and	comparative	studies	in	which	global	or	transnational	dimensions	
of	 such	 events	 have	 featured	 little,	 if	 at	 all.	 Over	 recent	 years,	 however,	 as	
criminology	 has	 turned	 to	 consider	 transnational	 and	 global	 conditions,	
recognition	has	 increasingly	been	paid	 to	 the	 importance	of	arenas	beyond	 the	
state	to	the	causes,	conduct,	and	consequences	of	otherwise	local	experiences	of	
crime	 and	 punishment.	 Although	 a	 relatively	 nascent	 subject	 of	 research,	
international	 dimensions	 of	 the	 performance	 and	 policing	 of	 public	 disorder	
have	attracted	the	attention	of	scholars	both	within	and	beyond	the	field.	Pakes	
and	Pritchard		(2014),	 for	example,	have	drawn	attention	to	the	ways	 in	which	
riots	are	today	relayed	via	a	wide	range	of	media	to	global	audiences,	potentially	
leading	to	the	international	diffusion	of	political	messages	and	local	practices,	as	
well	 as	 facilitating	 their	possible	 commodification,	whilst	Sheptycki	 (2005)	has	
underlined	the	relevance	of	the	way	in	which	protests	are	policed	in	peripheral	
jurisdictions	 of	 the	 global	 system	 to	 accurately	 gauging	 emergent	 trends	 in	
transnational	policing.	In	turn,	the	way	in	which	pressures	stemming	from	global	
actors	and	markets	have	been	refracted	through	national	and	local	settings	has	
been	 identified	 as	 producing	 patterns	 of	 so‐called	 ‘glocal’	 contention	 (Auyero	
2001).	Thus,	for	instance,	the	International	Monetary	Fund	has	been	seen	as	the	
source	of	 core	 stimuli	 for	 localised	protests	 in	peripheral	 economies	due	 to	 its	
promotion	of	austerity	reforms	(e.g.,	Walter	and	Ragin	1990;	Walton	and	Sedon	
1994;	 Auyero	 2001;	 see	 also	 Engels	 2015).	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	 O’Neill	 (2004),	
moreover,	 since	 the	 late	 1990s	 many	 countries	 around	 the	 world	 have	
experienced	 large	 and	 often	 disruptive	 protests	 against	 globalization	 itself,	
which	have	 embodied	 a	 form	of	 internationally	networked	 activism	where	not	
only	discourses	and	tactics	of	contention,	but	also	a	significant	body	of	protesting	
participants,	 travel	 across	 jurisdictions.	 Policing	 repertoires	 have	 evolved	 in	
tandem	with	 those	 of	 protestors,	with	 national	 police	 forces	 drawing	 on	 their	
own	 transnational	 sources	 of	 direct	 and	 indirect	 exchanges	 with	 colleagues	
abroad	(see	further	Della	Porta	and	Tarrow	2012).	
		
The	 unrest	 that	 emanated	 in	 Athens	 and	 rolled	 out	 across	 Greek	 cities	 in	
December	 2008	might	 at	 first	 sight	 appear	 an	 unlikely	 case	 through	which	 to	
advance	 understanding	 of	 how	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 local,	 national	 and	
international	 arenas	 may	 together	 shape	 localised	 episodes	 of	 disorder.	 The	
Greek	unrest	was	neither	foreign‐induced	(it	was	not,	for	example,	triggered	by	
socio‐economic	hardships	 imposed	by	 international	 institutions),	nor	primarily	
international	 in	 terms	of	 the	composition	of	 those	 involved	 in	 the	unrest	or	 its	
policing,	nor	overwhelmingly	 international	with	regard	 to	 its	ramifications.	Yet	
the	ubiquity	of	references	to	the	international	that	can	be	found	in	diverse	and	
otherwise	divergent	accounts	of	the	disorder	suggests	that	further	examination	
of	 the	 ‘glocal’	 credentials	of	 the	case	 is	nevertheless	merited.	 In	 this	article,	we	
pursue	 such	 an	 examination	 through	 consideration	 of	 the	 causes,	 conduct	 and	
consequences	of	the	events.		
	
In	so	doing,	we	address	a	range	of	dimensions	proposed	by	Newburn	(this	issue)	
in	his	‘life‐cycle’	model	of	riots,	which	foregrounds	not	only	the	context,	nature,	
and	 dynamics	 of	 riots	 but	 also,	 crucially,	 their	 aftermath.	 With	 regard	 to	 the	
latter,	Newburn’s	model	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 subsequent	 framing	 of	 riots	 in	
political,	 media	 and	 public	 discourse,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 penal	 and	 public	 policy	
responses	by	the	state.	In	this	vein,	we	adopt	a	broad	perspective	to	explore	the	
aftermath	of	 the	Greek	unrest,	but	extend	 it	beyond	discursive	representations	
and	 the	 evolution	 and	 implementation	 of	 policy	 to	 encompass	 in	 addition	 the	
behaviour	of	non‐state	actors.		
	
We	begin	by	presenting	a	synopsis	of	the	Greek	unrest	of	December	2008	before	
turning	to	examine	accounts	of	its	proximate	and	structural	causes.	We	go	on	to	
explore	 the	 multifarious	 character	 of	 protest	 actions,	 including	 novel	 and	
derivative	forms	of	contestation	deployed	by	protestors,	and	public	debate	about	
the	appropriate	apportioning	of	blame	amongst	the	variety	of	actors	engaged	in	
the	 unrest.	 Finally,	 we	 look	 at	 the	 diverse	 outcomes	 of	 the	 unrest	 and	 their	
impact	upon	extant	socio‐political	tensions.	For	each	stage	of	the	lifecycle	of	the	
unrest,	 from	 inception,	 to	performance,	 to	 legacy,	we	evaluate	 the	 relevance	of	
international	actors,	practices	and	discourses.		
	
Introducing	the	events	of	December	2008	
For	three	weeks	in	December	2008,	Greece	was	convulsed	by	unrest	that	swept	
from	 Athens	 to	 include	 all	 major	 and	 many	 minor	 urban	 centres	 across	 the	
country.	The	killing	of	Alexis	Grigoropoulos,	 an	unarmed	15‐year‐old	boy,	by	a	
police	 officer	 in	 an	 apparent	 act	 of	machismo	 on	 6	 December	 2008,	 is	 widely	
acknowledged	 to	 have	 been	 the	 trigger	 for	 the	 unrest	 that	 ensued:	 eight	
consecutive	 days	 of	 rioting	 in	 Athens	 alone,	 and	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 other	
mobilisations	that	accompanied	the	violence	and	extended	beyond	it.		
	
Shortly	 after	 9pm	 on	 the	 evening	 of	 6	 December	 in	 the	 Exarcheia	 district	 of	
central	Athens,	a	two‐member	police	patrol	engaged	in	a	verbal	altercation	from	
inside	their	car	with	a	group	of	young	teenagers	who	were	standing	 in	an	area	
close	 to	 cafes	 and	 bars,	 enjoying	 a	 night	 out.	 The	 policemen	 were	 ordered	 to	
withdraw	 from	 the	area	by	 the	police	operations	 centre	with	which	 they	were	
communicating,	but	instead	parked	their	car	and	returned	to	confront	the	youths	
on	foot.	One	of	the	policemen	drew	his	weapon	and	took	aim	at	the	group,	firing	
several	times	and	killing	Grigoropoulos.	The	accusation	leveled	in	due	course	by	
the	perpetrator	and	his	defence	lawyer	that	the	victim,	a	privately	educated	boy	
of	middle	 class	parents,	had	manifested	 ‘deviant	behaviour’	was	widely	denied	
and	condemned	(see	further	Giovanopoulos	and	Dalakoglou	2011).		
	
Hundreds	 were	 detained	 by	 the	 police	 and	 dozens	 were	 injured	 during	 the	
unrest	that	swiftly	followed	news	of	Grigoropoulos’	death,	whilst	the	cost	of	the	
damage	 caused	 by	 rioting	 has	 been	 estimated	 at	 over	 €1.5	 billion	 (see,	 e.g.,	
Kalyvas	 2010).	 The	 duration,	 spread	 and	 intensity	 of	 the	 unrest	 were	 widely	
deemed	 to	have	been	unprecedented	by	 the	standards	of	 comparable	episodes	
since	 the	 restoration	 of	 democracy	 in	 the	 country	 in	 1974.	 It	 comes	 as	 no	
surprise,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 disorder	 stimulated	 intense	 public	 and	 academic	
debate	over	 the	essence	of	 the	events	and	 their	broader	 significance.	By	 some,	
the	events	were	framed	as	nihilistic	riots	that	were	the	culmination	of	a	culture	
of	permissiveness	towards	deviance,	violence	and	mindless	resistance	to	change,	
and	 were	 the	 product,	 in	 significant	 part,	 of	 an	 underdeveloped	 civil	 society.	
Others	–and	 this	was	an	 interpretation	 supported	by	 the	majority	of	Greeks	at	
the	 time–	 rather	 portrayed	 the	 events	 as	 a	 ‘social	 uprising’	 driven	 by	 socio‐
economic	 and	 political	 malaise	 as	 well	 as	 police	 violence,	 and	 constituting	 a	
novel	 and	 future‐oriented	 corpus	of	 collective	 action	 (see	 further	 Sotiris	2013;	
Kotronaki	and	Seferiades	2012;	Vradis	2012).		
	
Accordingly,	 in	 addition	 to	 acknowledging	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 events	 of	
December	2008	that	belies	 their	simple	 labeling	as	 ‘riots’,	our	 treatment	of	 the	
events	below	also	draws	attention	 to	 the	manner	 in	which	 their	 interpretation	
came	 to	 illustrate	 important	 continuities	 in	 the	 performance	 of	 contentious	
politics,	from	street	action	to	political,	media	and	scholarly	arenas.	
	 	
Accounting	for	the	emergence	of	the	unrest	
Explanations	 of	 the	 unrest	 of	 December	 2008	 have	 commonly	 ranged	 across	
proximate	 factors	 to	 those	 structural;	 from	 the	 trigger	 or	 ‘flashpoint’,	 to	 the	
dynamics	 between	 the	 state	 and	 social	 groups,	 to	 spatial,	 cultural,	 socio‐
economic	and	political	backdrops.	Many	of	the	debates	surrounding	these	factors	
have	 concerned	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 events	 of	 2008	 presented	 a	 novel	
configuration	by	comparison	with	prior	moments	of	unrest	in	the	Greek	context.	
A	 prominent	 theme	 in	 this	 regard	 has	 been	 the	 international	 features	 of	 the	
unrest	 in	2008,	 especially	 the	 approaches	 to	 contention	developed	by	 activists	
following	exposure	to	international	protest	experiences.	
	
It	 came	as	 little	 surprise	 that	 the	 spark	of	 the	unrest	was	 lit	 in	Exarcheia.	The	
commonly	referenced	‘bohemian’	character	of	the	district,	densely	populated	by	
students	and	anarchists	as	it	is,	has	played	a	key	role	in	its	construction	as	a	site	
of	 frequent	 violent	 interactions	 between	 unruly	 youths	 and	 the	 police.	 Indeed,	
the	 banality	 of	 weekly	 small‐scale	 skirmishes	 between	 local	 anarchists	 and	
police	 in	 this	 area	goes	 some	way	 towards	explaining	how,	 in	2008,	 the	police	
officer	who	killed	Grigoropoulos	 could	have	perceived	shooting	at	an	unarmed	
young	teenager	following	a	very	minor	altercation	to	be	an	acceptable	course	of	
action.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	very	same	district	was	the	setting	for	
the	killing	of	another	unarmed	15‐year‐old	boy	by	a	police	officer	back	in	1985,	
which	also	provoked	riots,	albeit	of	a	far	lesser	spread	and	intensity	than	those	of	
2008	 (Vradis	 2012).	 Substantive	 dissimilarities	 between	 the	 two	 cases	 help	 to	
explain	 their	 differential	 outcomes.	 In	 both	 instances,	 however,	 an	 act	
perpetrated	by	a	single	police	officer	was	sufficient	to	spark	riots	because	of	the	
reputation	 for	 brutality	 with	 impunity	 that	 the	 police	 have	 long	 had	 in	 the	
country	 (____).	 Indeed,	 despite	 government	 efforts	 to	 present	 Grigoropoulos’	
killing	 in	2008	 through	a	 ‘one	bad	apple’	 framework,	whereby	 the	actions	of	 a	
particular	officer	were	framed	as	having	sharply	deviated	from	the	practices	of	
an	 otherwise	 law‐abiding	 force	 (see,	 e.g.,	Naftemporiki	 December	7,	 2008),	 the	
case	rather	testified	to	the	systemic	nature	of	police	abuses.	This	was	not	just	in	
the	 eyes	of	 the	protestors	who	 took	 to	 the	 streets,	 but	 also	 for	 the	majority	of	
scholarship	 on	 the	 unrest,	 in	 which	 micro‐level	 accounts	 of	 police	 violence	
featured	relatively	little.	
	
Amongst	the	debates	about	structural‐level	explanatory	factors	for	the	unrest	of	
December	2008,	those	concerning	its	cultural	roots	have	perhaps	been	the	most	
fraught,	 split	 between	 those	 viewing	 the	 events	 as	 symptomatic	 of	 persistent	
Greek	 traditions	 that	 romanticise	 unruliness	 regardless	 of	 socio‐economic	 or	
political	 conditions,	 and	 those	 regarding	 the	 events	 as	 something	 of	 a	 point	 of	
rupture	with	dominant	protest	tropes	in	the	country.	Thus,	a	prominent	account	
for	 the	 unrest	 of	 2008,	 put	 forward	 predominantly	 by	 conservative	
commentators,	 has	 been	 that	 those	 involved	 were	 conditioned	 to	 do	 so	 by	 a	
national	“culture	of	violence”	 that	has	 long	provided	substantial	 legitimation	to	
resistance	against	the	state.	Political	scientist	Stathis	Kalyvas,	a	key	proponent	of	
this	thesis,	argues	that	such	attitudes	came	to	prevail	 in	Greek	society	with	the	
fall	 of	 the	 country’s	 dictatorship	 in	 1974	 and	 the	 sanctification	 that	 he	 argues	
was	 subsequently	 bestowed	by	 left‐wing	 governments	 on	 the	 anti‐dictatorship	
struggle,	as	well	as	on	its	values	and	tactics	(e.g.,	Kalyvas	2008;	Athens	Plus	2010;	
see	also	Andronikidou	and	Kovras	2012;	Karamichas	2009).		
	
Some	 commentators	 supportive	 of	 the	 protestors	 have	 also	 acknowledged	 the	
role	 of	 socialization	 into	 repertoires	 of	 contention	 to	 explain	 the	 extent	 and	
forms	 of	 protest	manifested	 in	December	 2008,	 although	 interpreting	 these	 as	
having	 been	 fuelled	 by	 ongoing	 socio‐economic	 strains	 within	 Greek	 society.	
Thus,	 for	 instance,	 it	has	been	recognized	that	many	young	Greeks	already	had	
direct	experience	of	participating	 in	organised	protests	–from	recurrent	 school	
and	 university	 occupations	 and	 political	 assemblies,	 to	 demonstrations	 and	
ensuing	 clashes	 with	 the	 police–,	 which	 meant	 they	 also	 had	 an	 established	
repertoire	of	contention	and	solidarity	networks	 from	which	 they	were	able	 to	
draw	inspiration	and	support	in	reacting	to	the	murder	of	Grigoropoulos	in	2008	
(Kanellopoulos	 2012;	 Kotronaki	 and	 Seferiades	 2012;	 Lountos	 2012).	 Indeed,	
given	the	high	levels	of	contentious	politics	to	have	unfurled	in	Greece	since	the	
end	of	 the	dictatorship	 (see,	e.g.,	Gallant	1995;	Kornetis	2014),	 the	youth	were	
not	 alone	 in	 this	 respect,	 as	 different	 generations	 participating	 in	 the	 2008	
unrest	were	likely	to	have	had	prior	experience	of	contention,	from	which	they,	
too,	were	able	to	draw.		
	
Nevertheless,	and	notwithstanding	criticism	of	the	notion	that	a	 ‘lenient	 legacy’	
effect	pertained	at	all	 in	Greece	 following	1974	(____),	a	considerable	swathe	of	
discourse	 issued	 by	 the	 protestors	 involved	 in	 the	 unrest	 of	 2008	 directly	
rejected	 the	 presumed	 heritage	 of	 the	 Greek	 anti‐dictatorship	 struggle	 in	 any	
case	(Kornetis	2010).	Not	only	did	the	protests	of	2008	manifest	a	more	radical	
politics	 than	had	 the	 struggles	 associated	with	 the	 anti‐dictatorship	movement	
and	its	generation	of	resistors‐turned‐elites;	that	 is,	seeking	change	at	the	 level	
of	 the	 system	 rather	 than	merely	 of	 elites	 in	 power.	 They	 also	 gave	 voice	 to	 a	
critique	 of	 what	 was	 construed	 as	 the	 previous	 generation’s	 betrayal	 of	
progressive	 ideals	 over	 the	 intervening	 timeframe	 and,	 as	 testified	 by	 scandal	
after	 scandal	 in	 the	2000s,	 their	 increasing	 involvement	 in	political	 corruption	
(Bratsis	2010).		
	
Moreover,	 a	 significant	 segment	 of	 protestors	 active	 in	 December	 2008	 were	
argued	 to	 have	drawn	 inspiration	 and	 support	 from	experiences	 of	 contention	
garnered	outside	of	what	would	be	considered	 ‘homegrown’	cultural	and	social	
frames	of	reference.	Many	Greek	anarchists,	for	example,	shared	ideas	and	made	
connections	through	participating	in	anti‐globalisation	gatherings	across	Europe,	
such	as	that	held	during	the	International	Monetary	Fund	meeting	 in	Prague	in	
2000,	and	the	G8	summit	in	Genoa	in	2001	(Bratsis	2010;	Schwarz	et	al.	2010).	It	
is,	 perhaps,	 no	 coincidence	 that	 the	 first	 discussion	 about	 establishing	 an	
independent	 media	 center	 in	 Greece	 took	 place	 amongst	 demonstrators	
returning	 from	 the	 Genoa	 protests	 on	 board	 a	 boat	 in	 July	 2001.	 Indymedia	
started	 operating	 in	 the	 country	 as	 of	 November	 that	 year,	 providing	
instantaneous	 recording	 and	 news	 of	 protest	 actions	 as	 well	 as	 of	 violence	
perpetrated	by	the	police,	and	went	on	to	play	a	key	role	in	the	December	2008	
unrest	(Metropolitan	Sirens	2011).	Equally,	Greek	activists	had	the	opportunity	
to	 influence	 and	 be	 influenced	 by	 their	 foreign	 counterparts	 when	 the	 latter	
joined	in	similar	protests	in	Greece,	as	with	that	which	took	place	around	the	EU	
summit	meeting	 in	 Thessaloniki	 in	 2003	 (Sullivan	 2008;	 Schwarz	 et	 al.	 2010),	
even	if	numbers	travelling	to	Greece	on	that	occasion	were	relatively	small.1	
	
Accounts	 of	 the	 socio‐economic	 dimensions	 of	 the	 unrest	 proved	 equally	
controversial.	One	narrative	prevalent	at	the	time	denied	that	there	was	a	socio‐
economic	impetus,	arguing	that	the	youth	involved	in	the	unrest	were	the	first	of	
many	 generations	 to	 enjoy	 greater	 affluence	 than	 their	 parents	 (see	 further	
Giovanopoulos	 and	 Dalakoglou	 2011).	 This	 interpretation	 was	 challenged	 by	
many	commentators	who	made	reference	to	grievances	that	had	developed	prior	
to	 the	 unrest	 amongst	 the	 country’s	 youth	 about	 inadequate	 employment	
opportunities	 and	 the	 prospect	 of	 low	 salaries,	with	 new	 university	 graduates	
widely	dubbed	“the	generation	of	700	euros”,	in	reference	to	the	modest	monthly	
wage	 they	could	hope	 to	secure	 (Johnston	and	Seferiades	2012,	p.	150).	At	 the	
time	of	the	unrest,	such	youth	were	not	invariably	the	poorest	amidst	a	society	
with	 one	 of	 the	 highest	 rates	 of	 poverty	 in	 the	 EU	 (themselves	 linked	 to	
stubbornly	 low	 wage	 levels),	 yet	 welfare	 structures	 in	 Greece	 have	 long	
neglected	 the	 young	 and	 focused	 on	 the	 old.	 With	 active	 labour	 market	
programmes	 practically	 non‐existent,	 levels	 of	 investment	 in	 research	 and	
development	 very	 low,	 and	 rates	 of	 youth	 unemployment	 already	 very	 high,	
rising	 aspirations	 at	 that	 point	 looked	 particularly	 hard	 for	 young	 Greeks	 to	
meet,	even	if	their	prospects	were	subsequently	to	worsen	significantly	(____).		
	
Finally,	aside	from	cultural	and	socio‐economic	explanations	of	the	unrest	have	
been	 those	 emphasizing	 its	 political	 drivers.	 Frustrations	 in	 Greece	 with	 high	
rates	of	 income	 inequality,	 as	well	 as	with	 repeated	major	 corruption	 scandals	
involving	networks	amongst	the	country’s	power	elite,	have	long	stood	at	a	very	
high	 level	 by	 European	 comparison.	 Whilst	 in	 prior	 years	 clientelism	 was	
deployed	 to	 shore	 up	public	 support	 for,	 and	mollify	mass	 consternation	 over,	
the	standard	operating	procedures	of	 the	political	 system,	 the	 retrenchment	of	
government	 spending	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 2000s	 inevitably	meant	 that	 this	
																																																								
1	For	 a	 skeptical	 assessment	 of	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 there	 was	 cross‐fertilisation	 of	 ideas	 and	
practices	between	Greek	and	foreign	anarchists	during	this	period,	see	Trocchi	(2011).		
strategy	of	pacification	was	weakened	 (____).	 Compounding	 the	 slow	decline	 in	
the	reach	of	clientelism,	several	scandals	rocked	the	legitimacy	of	the	power	elite	
in	 the	months	preceding	 the	December	2008	unrest:	 one	 tying	political,	media	
and	 ecclesiastical	 power‐holders	 to	 a	 large‐scale	 fraud	 (the	 Vatopedi	 scandal),	
and	 one	 implicating	 the	 two	 dominant	 political	 parties	 of	 the	 era	 (New	
Democracy	 and	 PASOK)	 in	 extensive	 bribery	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 international	
engineering	 firm	 Siemens.	 In	 both	 cases,	 elite	 denial	 and	 apparent	 impunity	
exacerbated	 public	 anger	 towards	 the	 political	 system	 and	 the	 absence	 of	
credible	alternatives	within	it	(see	further	Bratsis	2012;	Johnston	and	Seferiades	
2012),	 further	 propelling	 the	 appeal	 and	 logic	 of	 extra‐parliamentary	 political	
mobilisations	(____).	
	 	
Conducting	the	unrest	
For	 a	 people	 with	 a	 reputation	 for	 unruliness	 and	 a	 country	 that	 over	 recent	
years	has	 seen	 large‐scale	unrest	 resurface	 in	 response,	 at	 least	 in	part,	 to	 the	
imposition	of	 financial	 austerity	measures,	 the	 events	 of	December	2008	were	
nonetheless	to	prove	unparalleled	in	terms	of	their	duration,	geographic	spread	
(within	 and	 beyond	 the	 country)	 and	 violent	 intensity.	 Meanwhile,	 the	
heterogeneity	of	 the	protests,	both	with	regard	 to	 the	range	of	acts	carried	out	
and	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 protestors	 (in	 terms	 of	 their	 class,	 ethnicity	 and	
political	affiliation),	meant	that	the	character	of	the	unrest	and	the	overarching	
message	of	the	protestors	would	elude	simple	definition.		
	
As	news	of	the	killing	spread	via	mobile	phones	and	web‐based	social	media	on	
the	 evening	 of	 Saturday	 6	 December,	 crowds	 took	 to	 the	 streets	 in	 cities	
throughout	 the	 country.	 Some	 began	 clashing	with	 police,	 as	well	 as	 attacking	
police	stations	and	banks,	and	smashing	and	burning	luxury	stores,	whilst	others	
–primarily	 anarchists	 and	 leftists–	 started	 university	 occupations.	 It	 was	 also	
predominantly	 leftist	 and	 anarchist	 groups	 that,	 by	 the	 following	 day,	 had	
organised	 meetings	 to	 plan	 strategic	 responses	 to	 the	 killing.	 On	 Sunday	 7	
December,	 a	 demonstration	 held	 in	 Athens	 against	 the	 killing,	 attended	 by	
thousands,	 descended	 into	 violence,	 with	 many	 banks	 and	 other	 commercial	
properties	 being	 subjected	 to	 attack.	 Protestors	 across	 Greece	 continued	 to	
mobilise	outside	police	stations	and	to	attack	them,	and	street	barricades	were	
also	set	up	(see	further	Schwarz	et	al.	2010;	Johnston	and	Seferiades	2012).	
	
The	 highpoint	 of	 unrest	was	 on	Monday	 8	 December.	 Pupils	 occupied	 schools	
and	joined	marches	on	the	streets	(some	estimates	of	the	numbers	marching	in	
Athens	placed	them	at	over	10,000),	protestors	engaged	in	violent	clashes	with	
the	 police,	 and	 looting	 and	 attacks	 on	 state	 buildings,	 police	 stations	 and	
business	 properties	 continued	 across	 the	 country,	 including	 food	
‘expropriations’	from	supermarkets	by	anarchists	for	redistribution.	As	protests	
and	riots	persisted	the	following	day,	thousands	of	prisoners	in	Greece	joined	in	
by	refusing	food.	On	December	10,	a	long‐scheduled	general	strike	was	called	off	
with	a	view	 to	avoiding	an	escalation	of	 the	unrest,	but	 thousands	gathered	 to	
march	 anyway.	Rallies,	 university	 and	 school	 occupations,	 strikes	 of	 university	
staff,	 school	 teachers	 and	 other	 workers,	 as	 well	 as	 rioting	 and	 clashes	 with	
police,	 continued	 in	 cities	 across	 Greece,	 gradually	 dissipating	 over	 the	 next	
couple	of	weeks	(see	further	Schwarz	et	al.	2010;	Johnston	and	Seferiades	2012).		
	
The	relatively	recent	growth	of	social	media	technologies	played	a	key	role	in	the	
rise	of	simultaneous	and	subsequent	acts	of	protest	 in	diffuse	locations.	Athens	
Indymedia,	 for	 instance,	 was	 reportedly	 the	 first	 outlet	 to	 break	 news	 of	 the	
killing	of	Grigoropoulos,	via	a	phonecall	 to	 the	site,	 just	eight	minutes	after	 the	
shooting,	 news	 that	 then	 dispersed	 through	 other	 social	 media	 forums.	 By	
contrast	with	the	swiftness	and	accuracy	of	the	Indymedia	accounts,	it	was	forty	
minutes	 before	 the	 first	 news	 bulletin	 was	 relayed	 from	 a	 mainstream	 TV	
channel	 and,	 even	 then,	 with	 a	 partial	 and	 distorted	 account	 of	 the	 story	
(Metropolitan	Sirens	2012).		
	
More	traditional	forms	of	media	also	played	a	prominent	and	important	role	in	
the	 December	 unrest,	 however,	 providing	 leadership	 and	 serving	 to	 mobilise	
potential	 protestors.	 In	 particular,	 the	 period	 saw	 a	 wave	 of	 pamphlets	 being	
produced	 and	 political	 texts	 being	 distributed,	 whilst	 graffiti	 was	 drawn	 to	
spread	 protest	 slogans	 and	 imagery.	 The	 precise	 mode	 of	 communication	
nevertheless	 assumed	 a	 novel	 dimension	 in	 December	 2008	 in	 that	 messages	
were	 extensively	 expressed	 in	 foreign	 languages	 as	 well:	 the	 degree	 to	 which	
French	and	English	were	used	 in	 leaflets	and	graffiti	was	without	precedent	 in	
the	 contemporary	 Greek	 context	 and	 demonstrated	 the	 exceptional	 effort	 by	
organised	 protestors	 to	 communicate	 with	 audiences	 beyond	 the	 nation’s	
borders	(see	further	Kornetis	2010).	As	unrest	spread,	it	was	the	use	of	both	new	
and	 traditional	 media	 which	 thus	 made	 possible	 the	 intimate	 intertwining	 of	
local,	national	 and	 international	acts	of	protest,	helping	 to	 shape	an	episode	of	
‘glocal’	 contentious	 politics	 (Kornetis	 2010;	Kotronaki	 and	 Seferiades	 2012);	 a	
point	to	which	we	return	further	below.		
	
Other	 forms	 of	 contestation	 during	 the	 unrest	 of	 December	 2008	 also	 went	
beyond	longstanding	protest	repertoires	in	the	country,	including	several	highly	
symbolic	acts.	Two	innovative	protest	acts	gained	exceptional	prominence:	first,	
the	 burning	 down	 of	 the	 enormous,	 record‐high	 Christmas	 tree	 in	 Syntagma	
square,	opposite	parliament	in	the	centre	of	Athens,	leading	the	state	to	have	riot	
police	 stationed	 around	 the	 tree;	 and	 second,	 an	 occupation	 of	 the	 public	
television	 station	 NET	 by	 a	 group	 of	 artists	 and	 anarchists	 who	 used	 it	 to	
broadcast	a	call	for	all	citizens	to	join	them	on	the	streets	for	a	general	uprising	
(see	further	Schwarz	et	al.	2010).		
	
The	geographic	reach	of	the	unrest	of	December	2008	was	also	unprecedented	in	
the	repertoires	of	contemporary	Greek	protest.	Although	pre‐existing	networks	
of	solidarity,	as	developed	through	shared	and	repeated	experience	of	protests,	
undoubtedly	 facilitated	 swift	 and	 extensive	 mobilisations	 across	 the	 country,	
(Lountos	2012;	Johnston	and	Seferiades	2012;	Kanellopoulos	2012),	the	protests	
stretched	 beyond	 such	 networks,	 not	 only	 within	 Greece	 (e.g.,	 to	 include	
prisoners,	 as	 mentioned	 above),	 but	 outside	 the	 country,	 too.	 As	 the	 unrest	
continued,	mobilisations	arose	in	a	striking	number	of	countries,	with	foreigners,	
as	well	 as	expatriates,	 seeking	 to	express	 their	solidarity	with	 those	protesting	
Grigoropoulos’	 death	 in	 Greece.	 From	 banner	 drops	 and	 demonstrations	 to	
university	occupations	and	attacks	on	banks,	acts	of	solidarity	took	place	in	cities	
across	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 European	 continent,	 North	 America,	 Latin	 America,	
Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand,	 whilst	 foreign	 anarchists	 intent	 on	 participating	
directly	 in	 the	 Greek	 protests	 reportedly	 converged	 on	 Greece	 ‘in	 droves’		
(Kalyvas	2010;	Trocchi	2011).2			
	
Although	acts	of	protest	involving	property	damage	constituted	a	small	fraction	
of	 the	 Greek	 unrest	 and	 dropped	markedly	 after	 peaking	 on	 8	 December	 (see	
Papanikolopoulos	 2009,	 cited	 in	 Johnston	 and	 Seferiades	 2012),	 the	
unprecedented	material	 destruction	 incurred	 inevitably	 led	 public	 attention	 to	
focus	 on	 the	 violent	 dimensions	 of	 the	 protests	 and	 the	 identities	 of	 those	
responsible.	 Of	 all	 the	 damage	 wrought,	 that	 perpetrated	 against	 small	
independent	 businesses	 attracted	 the	 greatest	 public	 consternation.	 To	 the	
extent	 that	 the	 primary	 actors	 of	 the	 unrest	 were	 identified	 as	 middle‐class	
youths,	 whether	 anarchists	 and	 leftists	 or	 otherwise	 unaffiliated,	 many	
mainstream	 commentators	 decried	 the	 rioting	 as	 frivolous	 attacks	 by	 the	 rich	
against	 the	 poor	 (Giovanopoulos	 and	 Dalakoglou	 2011).	 Assumptions	 that	
anarchist	 groups	 were	 primarily	 responsible	 for	 the	 high	 levels	 of	 property	
damage	 were	 challenged	 by	 some	 accounts	 from	 anarchists	 themselves,	 who	
suggested	 that	 high‐school	 students	 and	 immigrants	 actually	 performed	more	
brazenly	and	randomly	in	wielding	violence	during	the	unrest	(see,	e.g.,	Schwarz	
et	al.	2010:	98‐100;	also	Kanellopoulos	2012).		
	
Evidence	 that	 emerged	 of	 children	 acting	 as	 protagonists	 of	 violence	 certainly	
complicated	 the	 efforts	 of	mainstream	discourses	 to	 divide	 the	 protestors	 into	
‘peaceful,	 innocent	 schoolchildren’,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 ‘brainless,	 nihilistic’	
anti‐state	 groups	perpetrating	 their	 ‘familiar	 blind	 violence’,	 on	 the	other	 (see,	
e.g.,	Mouzelis	2009).	Assertions	 concerning	violence	perpetrated	by	 foreigners,	
meanwhile,	 appeared	 to	 have	 some	 resonance	 in	 police	 arrests	 for	 criminal	
offences	associated	with	the	unrest.	Whilst	a	total	of	284	arrests	were	estimated	
to	have	been	carried	out	in	relation	to	the	disorder	in	16	cities	and	towns	across	
Greece	 between	 6	 December	 2008	 and	 14	 January	 2009,	 figures	 released	 by	
ministerial	authorities	 in	 January	2009	showed	130	foreign	nationals	(whether	
foreign	anarchists	or	 immigrants	residing	 in	 the	country)	had	been	arrested	 in	
association	with	the	unrest	between	6	and	17	December	2008.	Given,	however,	
the	tentative	nature	of	the	total	number	of	arrests,	combined	with	longstanding	
vulnerabilities	of	 immigrants	 to	biased	practices	by	the	Greek	police,	questions	
remain	 as	 to	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 seeming	 overrepresentation	 of	 foreigners	 in	
arrests	 over	 this	 period	 (see,	 further,	 ____;	 Amnesty	 International	 2009).	
Nevertheless,	 immigrant	 involvement	 in	 the	 unrest	 was	 widely	 reported	 by	
mainstream	 media	 outlets,	 reinforcing	 popular	 stereotypes	 of	 immigrants	 as	
criminals	 (see,	 further,	 ____).	Not	all	 took	 this	view;	 the	role	of	 immigrants	was	
also	 strikingly	 interpreted	 as	 a	 form	 of	 civic	 participation	 in	 an	 episode	 of	
inclusive	solidarity	and	heralded	by	radicals	as	a	point	of	critical	rupture	for	the	
making	of	political	life	in	the	country	(Kalyvas	2010;	see	further	Michalis	2011;	
Sotiris	2010).	 Indeed,	 in	 this	sense	 the	 foreign	was	deemed	by	some	 to	be	 ‘the	
decisive	factor,	the	central	signifier’	of	the	unrest	(Kalyvas	2010:	356).	
		
																																																								
2 	An	 unofficial	 listing	 and	 map	 of	 these	 solidarity	 protest	 events	 is	 available	 at:	
http://greeksolidaritymap.blogspot.co.uk/2008/12/blog‐post.html	(accessed	30	October	2015).	
In	 mainstream	 discourses,	 however,	 considerable	 criticism	 was	 also	 levied	
against	 the	 government	 itself,	 for	 having	 failed	 to	 ensure	 timely	 and	 effective	
police	intervention	so	as	to	prevent	the	looting	and	destruction	from	spreading	
in	the	first	few	days	of	the	unrest.	In	an	effort	to	avoid	inflaming	the	unrest,	the	
government	 had	 reportedly	 restrained	 police	 actions	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	
protests.	 Thereafter,	 however,	 following	 the	 considerable	 damage	 wrought	 as	
well	 as	 growing	 pressure	 from	 the	 parliamentary	 opposition,	 the	 strategy	was	
reversed.	The	government	unleashed	maximum	force	short	of	putting	troops	on	
the	street;	an	option	allegedly	considered	during	an	emergency	cabinet	meeting	
on	 Monday	 8	 December,	 but	 rejected	 both	 because	 it	 might	 be	 counter‐
productive	and	because	it	might	undermine	Greece’s	democratic	credentials	(see	
further	Athens	News	December	17,	2010).		
	
A	few	days	later,	on	12	December,	it	was	widely	reported	that	Greece	had	issued	
an	international	appeal	for	tear	gas	supplies	since	the	country’s	police	had	used	
so	much	after	just	one	week	of	efforts	to	quell	the	protests.	This	was	against	the	
background	 of	 multiple	 reports	 and	media	 testimonies	 not	 only	 of	 riot	 police	
training	 their	 guns	 on	 protestors	 and	 firing	 shots	 into	 the	 air	 during	
demonstrations,	but	also	using	excessive	 force	against	or	otherwise	 ill‐treating	
peaceful	 demonstrators,	 journalists	 and	 random	 bystanders.	 Numerous	
allegations	 emerged	 of	 the	 police	 arresting	 and	 detaining	 for	 several	 hours	
peaceful	protestors,	bystanders,	 lawyers	and	parents	of	detained	children,	both	
with	and	without	charge;	indeed,	in	several	locations	across	Greece,	there	were	
media	reports	of	parents	of	detained	children	having	 themselves	been	charged	
with	 child	 neglect.3	In	 the	 city	 of	 Larissa,	moreover,	 the	 police	 used	 legislative	
provisions	 on	 organised	 crime	 (for	 which	 any	 convictions	 would	 be	met	 with	
particularly	 harsh	 punishment)	 to	 arrest	 and	 charge	 17	 minors,	 who	 were	
detained	 overnight	 on	 8	 December	 without	 contact	 with	 their	 families	 or	
lawyers,	 and	 several	 were	 also	 allegedly	 beaten	 by	 police	 officers.	 All	 of	 the	
children	 were	 accused	 on	 near‐identical	 charge	 sheets	 of	 ‘forming	 a	 criminal	
organisation’,	despite	having	been	arrested	in	different	locations	and	at	different	
times	 (Amnesty	 International	 2009),	 and	 the	 charges	were	 only	 dropped	 after	
thousands	marched	in	protest	in	January	2009	(Schwarz	et	al.	2010).		
	
Undercover	 police	 officers	 and	 far‐right	 groups	 additionally	 attracted	
considerable	 controversy	 and	 criticism	 over	 their	 part	 in	 the	 violence	 of	
December	 2008,	 with	 the	media	 awash	with	 footage	 and	 photos	 of	 anarchist‐
styled	men	armed	with	steel	bars	mingling	collegially	with	uniformed	officers	in	
Athens	(see,	e.g.,	Ta	Nea,	December	11,	2008).	Public	debate	about	the	identities	
of	hooded	protestors	bent	on	violence	was	also	stoked	by	incidents	such	as	the	
attempt	 of	 five	 hooded	protestors	 carrying	 rocks	 to	 join	 a	 trade	 union	 rally	 in	
Athens	before	fleeing	when	unionists	asked	them	to	produce	their	identity	cards,	
as	 well	 as	 by	 allegations	 that	 far‐right	 sympathisers	 had	 infiltrated	
demonstrations	in	the	city	of	Patra	and	had	engaged	in	vandalism	against	shops	
whilst	 portraying	 themselves	 as	 ‘anarchists’	 (see	 further	 Schwarz	 et	 al.	 2011).	
Views	of	the	magnitude	of	the	role	potentially	played	by	agents	provocateurs	in	
																																																								
3	See,	 e.g.,	 https://clandestinenglish.wordpress.com/2008/12/30/arrests‐in‐greece‐during‐the‐
rebellion‐from‐061208‐to‐211208/#more‐330	
fomenting	the	violence	of	December	2008	ranged	widely	(see	further	Kotronaki	
and	Seferiades	2012).	In	any	case,	such	concerns	were	by	no	means	new	or	out	of	
place	 for	a	country	with	 long	 traditions	of	so‐called	 ‘para‐state’	activity	against	
leftists	(see	further	____).		
	
Consequences	of	the	unrest	
Interpretations	and	expectations	of	the	legacies	of	the	unrest	of	December	2008	
were	to	also	prove	as	diverse	and	divergent	as	had	been	the	protests	themselves.	
Once	 again,	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 unrest	 was	 commonly	 to	 be	 conceived	 –
whether	in	positive	or	negative	terms–	by	reference	to	international	as	well	as	to	
domestic	 arenas.	 Some	 commentators	 speculated,	 with	 trepidation,	 that	 the	
disorder	 might	 be	 internationally	 contagious	 given	 the	 concurrent	 global	
economic	downturn.	 In	much	 the	same	vein,	others	 later	claimed	 triumphantly	
that	 the	 events	 in	 Greece	 had	 indeed	 been	 a	 ‘harbinger	 of	 things	 to	 come’,	
whether	by	reference	to	the	many	contemporaneous	acts	of	protest	that	sprung	
up	around	the	world	in	solidarity	(Kotronaki	and	Seferiades	2012;	Makrygianni	
and	Tsavdaroglou	2011),	 or	 to	 the	 subsequent	 staggered	 eruption	of	 unrest	 in	
countries	 across	 Europe,	 North	 Africa	 and	 the	 Middle	 East	 (Johnston	 and	
Seferiades	 2012).	 Yet,	 for	 others,	 the	 fleeting	 nature	 of	 acts	 of	 empathy	 and	
emulation	 abroad	 was	 a	 source	 of	 disappointment.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 for	
instance,	 some	 anarchists	 sought	 to	 account	 for	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 unrest	 to	
spread	to	other	countries	in	any	sustained	fashion	(Schwarz	2010).		
	
Similar	debates	were	directed	at	 the	national	arena.	Whilst	numerous	political,	
media	 and	 scholarly	 commentators	 posited	 expectations	 of	 cumulative	 unrest	
inside	Greece	itself,	some	going	so	far	as	to	speak	of	the	potential	of	major	socio‐
political	 destabilisation	 as	 the	 country’s	 economy	 slid	 into	 sustained	 recession	
and	harsh	austerity	measures	were	imposed	(see	further	____),	others	questioned	
why	 the	 unrest	 had	 dissipated	 rather	 than	 continued	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2008	
(Johnston	and	Seferiades	2012).	Indeed,	notwithstanding	successive	episodes	of	
urban	disorder	in	the	years	that	followed,	none	to	date	have	matched	the	span,	
duration	or	intensity	of	December	2008	(____).4		
	
In	 any	 case,	 however,	 far	 from	 being	 a	 fundamentally	 anomic	 event	 or	 one	
limited	in	its	expression	to	nihilistic	destruction,	December	2008	not	only	drew	
on	 an	 array	 of	 established	 social	 networks,	 including	mainstream	 associations	
(Sotiris	2013),	but	even	proved	to	be	a	wellspring	for	civil	society	in	the	country.	
Across	Greece,	 the	unrest	gave	rise	to	a	flourishing	array	of	 ‘free’	public	spaces	
(e.g.,	squats	and	occupied	squares)	and	independently	organized	assemblies	and	
media.	Indeed,	many	of	these	functioned	as	an	increasingly	important	means	of	
support	 to	 a	 society	 facing	 mounting	 hardships,	 for	 example	 through	 the	
provision	 of	 soup	 kitchens,	 barter	 economies	 and	 free	 healthcare	 (see	 further	
Schwarz	et	al	2010;	Dalakoglou	2012;	Vradis	2012;	Sotiris	2013;	Kotronaki	and	
Seferiadis	2012).	
	
Any	 ‘progressive’,	 socially	 beneficial	 outcomes	 were	 more	 than	 matched,	
however,	by	 the	stimulus	 the	events	of	December	2008	gave	 to	 ‘dark’	 forms	of	
																																																								
4	Correct	at	the	time	of	writing,	i.e.,	December	2015.	
social	 capital	 (Putzel	 1997).	 On	 one	 hand,	 a	 domestic	 covert	 armed	 group,	
Epanastatikos	 Agonas	 (‘EA’,	 or	 ‘Revolutionary	 Struggle’),	 sought	 to	 take	
advantage	of	what	it	saw	as	a	powerful	new	momentum	towards	destabilization	
of	 the	 political	 system	 that	 had	 been	 opened	 up	 by	 the	 unrest.	 Notably,	 one	
month	after	Grigoropoulos’	killing	and	avowedly	 in	response	 to	 it,	EA	shot	at	a	
police	 patrol	 outside	 the	 Greek	 Ministry	 of	 Culture	 in	 Exarcheia,	 leaving	 one	
victim	critically	injured.	Over	the	course	of	2009,	EA	placed	two	large	car	bombs	
in	 Athens,	 one	 of	 which	 detonated	 causing	 minor	 injuries	 to	 a	 bystander	
(Kassimeris	2011).		
	
On	the	other	hand,	both	covert	and	overt	violence	by	the	far‐right	saw	a	dramatic	
escalation	 in	 2009,	 dubbed	 the	 ‘year	 of	 the	 black	 terror’	 by	 one	 mainstream	
newspaper	 in	 allusion	 to	 the	 colours	 of	 the	 far‐right	 organization	 Chrysi	 Avyi	
(‘Golden	 Dawn’),	 which	 at	 that	 point	 in	 time	 had	 not	 yet	 entered	 parliament	
(____).	 With	 a	 view,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 to	 counterbalancing	 the	 degree	 of	 agency	
demonstrated	by	anarchists	and	leftists	during	and	after	the	unrest	of	December	
2008,	 far‐right	 groups	 were	 emboldened	 to	 assert	 their	 own	 management	 of	
public	spaces,	establish	regular	armed	patrols	in	some	Athenian	neighbourhoods	
and	step	up	their	violent	attacks	on	foreigners,	minorities,	anarchists	and	leftists	
(Vradis	2012;	Dalakoglou	2013;	____).	In	what	has	been	convincingly	explained	as	
a	 reaction	 to	 the	 crisis	 of	 legitimacy	 the	 state	was	perceived	 to	be	 facing	 after	
having	 lost	 control	 of	 the	 streets	 in	 December	 2008,	 the	 center‐right	 media	
displayed	 a	 strikingly	 high	 degree	 of	 tolerance	 and	 support	 towards	 far‐right	
violence,	implicitly	treating	it	as	a	necessary	corrective	to	what	they	portrayed	as	
the	preceding	anarchist‐infused	disorder	(Psarras	2012).	
	
Beyond	 the	hopes	 and	 concerns	 that	 came	 to	 surround	non‐state	 actors	 in	 the	
wake	of	December	2008,	the	consequences	of	the	unrest	were	also	to	be	charted	
by	 reference	 to	 state	 policies	 and	practices.	 The	 state’s	 response	 to	 the	 unrest	
went	little	towards	addressing	protestors’	demands	and,	to	the	extent	that	state	
coercion	 was	 if	 anything	 intensified,	 in	 many	 respects	 surpassed	 a	 simple	
gesture	of	 rejection.	As	 concerns	 specifically	 the	manner	 in	which	 the	 criminal	
justice	system	responded	to	the	events	of	December	2008,	an	assessment	of	the	
treatment	 of	 protestors	 is	 hard	 to	make	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 public	 report	 –
official	or	otherwise–	on	the	numbers	of	those	convicted	or	the	sentences	passed	
by	 courts.	 Anecdotal	 evidence	 indicates	 that	 some	 convictions	 have	 been	
relatively	light,	even	though	the	judicial	process	has	been	subject	to	the	lengthy	
delays	for	which	the	Greek	criminal	justice	system	is	well	known.		
	
With	regard	 to	 the	 treatment	of	 the	police	officers	whose	actions	 triggered	 the	
unrest,	whilst	the	criminal	justice	response	proved	more	severe	than	expected,	it	
was	to	some	extent	mitigated	by	the	actions	of	the	Hellenic	Police	in	support	of	
the	officers	in	question	(not	to	mention	it	may	yet	be	subject	to	revision	as	such).	
Following	the	killing,	both	Epaminondas	Korkoneas,	the	policeman	who	shot	and	
killed	Grigoropoulos,	and	his	patrol	partner	Vassilios	Saraliotis	were	held	in	pre‐
trial	detention	 for	 the	maximum	18‐month	period	until	 June	2010.	Following	a	
protracted	 trial,	 Korkoneas	 was	 convicted	 of	 murder	 in	 October	 2010	 and	
sentenced	 to	 life	 imprisonment	 without	 possibility	 of	 a	 reduction	 in	 term;	 a	
harsher	 sentence	 than	 initially	 sought	 by	 the	 prosecution.	 The	 decision	 of	 the	
court	was	not	unanimous,	with	three	of	the	seven‐member	mixed	panel	of	judges	
and	 jurors	 advocating	 a	 lesser	 verdict	 of	 manslaughter	 with	 possible	 intent.	
Saraliotis,	meanwhile,	was	given	a	10‐year	prison	sentence	as	an	accomplice,	but	
was	released	a	year	later,	 in	October	2011.	Following	newspaper	revelations	in	
2013	 that	both	men	were	still	 employees	of	 the	Hellenic	Police	and	continuing	
regularly	 to	 receive	 a	 third	 of	 their	 monthly	 salaries,	 the	 force’s	 disciplinary	
council	 finally	 convened	 (after	having	 five	 times	postponed	meeting	 to	discuss	
the	 cases),	 ordering	 that	 the	officers	be	dismissed	but	 continue	 receiving	 their	
salaries	 until	 their	 appeals	 to	 have	 their	 convictions	 overturned	 were	 heard	
(Ekathimerini	 March	 20,	 2013).	 The	 appeals	 have	 been	 delayed	 and	 were	
expected	to	take	place	in	2015,	since	the	statute	of	limitations	for	certain	of	the	
charges	relating	to	misdemeanors	will	be	exceeded	in	2016	(To	Vima	March	11,	
2015).	
	
Notwithstanding	 the	 vagaries	 of	 the	 treatment	 accorded	 to	 the	 police	 officers	
specifically	 responsible	 for	 triggering	 the	protests	of	2008,	patterns	of	policing	
over	 successive	 years	 thereafter	 clearly	 indicate	 a	 further	 softening	 of	 official	
attitudes	 towards	 excessive	 police	 violence,	 with	 excessive	 police	 violence	
against	peaceful	protestors,	reporters	and	bystanders	during	and	after	protests	
having	 reportedly	 undergone	 significant	 increase	 over	 recent	 years	 (Amnesty	
International	2012,	2014a,	2014b;	Basille	and	Kourounis	2011).	There	has	also	
been	an	abundance	of	reports	about	police	abuses	 in	a	range	of	other	contexts,	
from	arbitrary	arrests,	to	detentions	on	false	charges	or	without	any	charges	at	
all,	 to	beatings	meted	out	 to	bystanders	complaining	about	police	abuse	and	to	
suspected	 anarchists	 and	 members	 of	 domestic	 armed	 groups,	 to	 torture	 and	
mistreatment	of	Roma,	migrants	and	asylum	seekers,	to	complicity	and	impunity	
towards	violence	perpetrated	by	far‐right	groups	(see	further	____).		
	
Sustaining	the	escalation	in	police	abuses	have	been	new	police	staff,	tactics	and	
strategies.	 In	 2009,	 for	 example,	 the	 newly	 inaugurated	 DELTA	 force,	 a	
motorcycle	squad	officially	tasked	with	combatting	vandalism	but	used	to	break	
up	demonstrations,	swiftly	gathered	a	reputation	for	uninhibited	use	of	violence	
as	a	 result	of	widely	disseminated	 footage	of	 their	standard	 tactic	of	driving	at	
protestors	 at	 speed	 to	 disperse	 crowds	 (see	 further	 Amnesty	 International	
2012).	 The	 following	 two	 years	 saw	 the	 addition	 of	 water	 cannon	 and	 plastic	
bullets	to	the	police’s	armoury	in	dealing	with	public	protest,	supplementing	the	
continuing	liberal	misuse	of	tear	gas	and	stun	grenades.	In	2012,	moreover,	the	
Hellenic	Police	launched	the	infamous	Orwellian‐named	operation	 ‘Xenios	Dias’	
(Hospitable	 Zeus),	 representing	 the	 culmination	 of	 years	 of	 so‐called	 ‘sweep’	
operations	by	 the	police,	 in	which	 individuals	presumed	 to	be	 foreigners	were	
detained	 whilst	 their	 residency	 paperwork	 was	 checked	 (____).	 Compounding	
police	 abuses,	 meanwhile,	 have	 been	 continuing	 efforts	 on	 the	 part	 of	 police	
authorities	to	distort	accountability	by	obstructing	or	otherwise	failing	to	pursue	
the	 identification,	 investigation,	 prosecution	 and	 effective	 punishment	 of	
perpetrators	(Amnesty	International	2014;	Dalakoglou	2013).		
	
Excessive	 police	 violence	 nevertheless	 constituted	 but	 one	 element	 of	 the	
spectrum	of	heightened	state	coercion	that	emerged,	in	large	part,	as	a	reaction	
to	 the	 events	 of	 December	 2008.	 In	 this	 vein	 were	 a	 number	 of	 important	
criminal	 justice	 reforms	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	 restriction	of	 legally	enshrined	
civil	 liberties	 in	 the	country.	One	key	reform	 to	stem	 from	the	December	2008	
unrest	 was	 the	 abolition	 in	 2011	 of	 so‐called	 ‘university	 asylum’;	 that	 is,	 Law	
1268/1982,	which	prohibited	police	from	entering	university	campuses	without	
permission	 of	 the	 Rector.	 Albeit	 having	 long	 provoked	 consternation	 amongst	
conservative	commentators,	 the	 impact	of	university	asylum	was	thought	to	be	
particularly	 egregious	 in	 December	 2008	 given	 the	 magnitude	 of	 destruction	
caused	 during	 the	 protests,	 having	 purportedly	 allowed	 perpetrators	 of	
destructive	 violence	 to	 evade	 capture	 and	 even	 rearm	 themselves	
unencumbered	by	police	controls.		
	
Another	important	reform	to	have	been	unveiled	in	response	to	the	unrest	was	
that	 targeting	 the	 so‐called	 ‘Hooded‐ones’,	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘known‐
unknowns’,	 who	 engaged	 in	 violence	 during	 protests.	 Whilst,	 as	 Pourgouris	
(2010)	has	pointed	out,	there	were	actually	multiple	constituencies	of	hooded	or	
otherwise	 facially	 obscured	 participants	 engaged	 in	 violence	 in	 the	 unrest	 of	
December	 2008	 –protestors,	 uniformed	 and	 plain‐clothed	 police	 officers,	 and	
far‐right	 actors	 operating	 alongside	 the	 police–,	 the	 term	was	 associated	 only	
with	protestors,	or	 those	appearing	 to	be	protestors,	 committing	violence	with	
their	faces	hidden.	Face	masks	of	one	sort	or	another	had	become	an	increasingly	
necessary	accoutrement	of	protest	in	the	country	over	prior	decades	due	to	the	
copious	use	of	 teargas	 regularly	made	by	 the	police	at	 such	events.	 In	 tandem,	
however,	 political	 concerns	 had	 grown	 about	 the	 impediments	 to	 protestor	
identification	posed	by	the	use	of	masks.	Five	months	after	the	December	2008	
unrest,	 in	May	 2009,	 the	 conservative	New	Democracy	 government	 succeeded	
where	 it	 had	 failed	 previously,	 in	 2007,	 to	 enact	 a	 law	 criminalising	 hoodies.	
According	to	Law	3772/2009,	wearing	a	hood	or	a	mask	would	be	considered	an	
aggravating	 factor	 in	 public	 order	 offences	 and	 incur	 a	 harsher	 sentence.	 The	
measure	remained	in	force	and	in	use	after	the	center‐left	PASOK	party	assumed	
office	in	October	2009,	despite	the	new	government	issuing	proclamations	to	the	
contrary	 shortly	 after	 its	 election.	 It	 was	 not	 until	 April	 2015	 that,	 under	
pressure	 from	 left‐wing	 SYRIZA	 members	 of	 parliament,	 the	 SYRIZA‐ANEL	
coalition	 government	 (ANEL	 being	 a	 party	 of	 the	 nationalist	 right)	 passed	 an	
amendment	to	the	law	making	the	wearing	of	a	hoodie	an	aggravating	factor	only	
in	cases	where	a	robbery	had	been	committed	(Kathimerini	April	18,	2015).	
	
In	conjunction	with	one	another,	different	elements	of	intensified	state	coercion	
have	 proved	 to	 play	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 fuelling	 social	 antagonisms	 since	 and	 in	
response	to	the	events	of	December	2008.	One	case,	above	all,	has	encapsulated	
these	complex	and	tragic	dynamics.	In	February	2013,	four	men	aged	20‐25	were	
arrested	 during	 an	 attempted	 armed	 bank	 robbery.	 Photos	 of	 the	 detained	
suspects	 issued	 by	 the	 police	 had	 been	 heavily	 and	 clumsily	 photoshopped	 to	
erase	 bruising	 and	 cuts	 to	 their	 faces	 that	 had	 already	 been	 publicised	 by	 the	
media.	 Public	 furore	 erupted,	 with	 three	 of	 the	 men	 reporting	 they	 had	 been	
tortured	whilst	detained	by	the	police,	and	the	police	counter‐claiming	that	the	
injuries	were	inflicted	during	the	arrest	of	the	men.	The	Minister	of	Public	Order	
and	Citizen	Protection,	meanwhile,	 justified	 the	photoshopping	as	necessary	 in	
order	for	the	defendants	to	be	recognizable	by	the	public	(MPO	2013).	One	of	the	
men,	who	was	sentenced	to	fifteen	years	imprisonment,	was	Nikos	Romanos.	In	
December	2008,	Romanos	was	a	15‐year‐old	close	friend	of	Alexis	Grigoropoulos	
and	 was	 beside	 Grigoropoulos	 when	 the	 latter	 was	 killed.	 In	 2014,	 Romanos	
began	a	prolonged	hunger	and	thirst	strike	in	protest	at	the	arbitrary	refusal	of	
the	authorities	to	grant	him	the	educational	leave	to	which	he	was	entitled.	With	
Romanos	close	 to	becoming	a	martyr	of	 the	 left	after	a	month	of	 striking,	with	
thousands	mobilized	in	his	support	across	Greece	in	demonstrations,	strikes	and	
occupations,	and	with	the	country	once	again	seemingly	at	risk	of	a	larger	social	
conflagration,	the	Greek	parliament	ratified	an	amendment	strengthening	access	
to	 educational	 furlough	 for	 prisoners	 through	 electronic	 tagging.	 Romanos’	
subsequent	efforts	to	secure	educational	leave	have	nevertheless	failed,	despite	
the	election	to	government	in	January	2015	of	the	left‐wing	SYRIZA	party,	which	
had	campaigned	in	his	support	(SYRIZA	2014;	To	Vima	September	25,	2015).	His	
case	 has	 continued	 to	 reach	 media	 headlines	 and	 to	 spark	 solidarity	 actions	
amongst	the	public.		
	
Conclusion	
The	Greek	case	 reaffirms	 the	principle	 that	 the	 international	 arena	 can	add	 to,	
yet	 rarely	 supplants,	 local	 and	 national	 actors	 and	 messages	 embroiled	 in	
instances	 of	 contentious	 political	 engagement	 such	 as	 riots	 (Auyero	 2001;	
Tarrow	 2005).	 Whilst	 not	 predominant	 over	 ‘home‐grown’	 aspects	 of	 social	
disorder,	 international	 factors	 proved	 to	 be	 interwoven	 in	 important	 ways	 at	
each	 stage	 of	 the	 lifecycle	 of	 the	 Greek	 unrest	 of	 2008,	 helping	 to	 shape	 its	
emergence,	conduct	and	consequences.			
	
Hence	 in	 Greece,	 before	 the	 unrest	 took	 place,	 some	 activist	 participants	 had	
developed	repertoires	of	action	not	only	within	the	country	but	also	at	protests	
abroad.	 During	 the	 upheavals,	 the	 participation	 of	 foreigners	 –activists	 and	
immigrants–	 was	 accorded	 particular	 significance	 by	 both	 protestors	 and	 the	
state.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 protesting	 performances	 incorporated	 clear	 efforts	 to	
communicate	with	foreign	audiences	in	addition	to	those	domestic.	In	turn,	there	
were	 responses	 from	 abroad,	with	 solidarity	 actions	 taking	 place	 in	 dozens	 of	
sites	 across	 the	 world	 by	 foreigners	 and	 expatriates.	 These	 were	 accorded	
divergent	 interpretations	 either	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 potential	 international	
contagiousness	of	the	Greek	unrest,	of	its	successful	international	diffusion,	or	–
given	 their	 short‐lived	 character–	 of	 its	 failure	 to	 effectively	 be	 transplanted	
elsewhere.	Finally,	after	the	unrest	subsided,	much	ink	was	spilt	expounding	the	
broader	ramifications	of	the	events	in	terms	of	social	and	political	stability,	both	
within	Greece	itself	and,	once	again,	internationally.		
	
With	regard	to	Greece’s	domestic	arena	in	particular,	we	also	find	that	once	the	
intense	unrest	concluded,	violent	contentious	politics	continued	to	ebb	and	flow	
and	 in	 some	 respects	 even	 escalated.	 Notwithstanding	 some	 relatively	
harmonious	 outcomes	 for	 civil	 society,	 far‐right	 and	 police	 violence	 saw	 a	
particularly	dramatic	increase,	helping	to	maintain	and	cultivate	social	tensions	
that	have	on	several	occasions	since	spilled	into	further	episodes	of	unrest.	Our	
study	also	thereby	underscores	the	value	of	exploring	the	aftermath	of	unrest	to	
appreciating	 trends	 in	 violent	 contentious	 politics,	 especially	 through	
consideration	of	the	legacy	of	disorder	for	the	range	of	actors	involved.	
	
At	 a	more	 general	 level,	 two	main	 implications	 flow	 from	 our	 study.	 First,	 the	
array	 of	 intersections	 between	 global,	 national	 and	 local	 dimensions	 of	 unrest	
are	more	diverse	than	has	heretofore	been	recognised	by	pertinent	scholarship.	
And	second,	significant	 ‘glocal’	properties	can	be	found	in	instances	of	disorder	
beyond	 those	 in	 which	 international	 or	 transnational	 factors	 are	 either	
preponderant	or	combine	in	equal	weight	with	national	and	local	dynamics.	The	
extent	 to	which	 ‘glocality’	may	 be	 an	 emergent	 feature	 of	 all	 local	 or	 national	
unrest,	 or	 is	 likely	 to	 occur	 in	 particular	 contexts	more	 so	 than	 in	 others,	 is	 a	
question	yet	to	be	answered.	
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